As Britain considers how to spur the development of private rental housin g, the Canadian experience should be of interest. Canada has a large stock of for-pro® t private rental housing. M ajor innovations in ® nancing and im provements in liquidit y of the rental stock over the past half-century have made such investments more attractive. Canada also has a substantial stock of social housin gÐ publi c housing, non-pr o® t housing , and non-equity cooperativesÐ that com petes with the private rental sector for tenants. The Canadian publi c policy experience (from housin g subsidies to rental market regulation), varying as it does among ten provinces in an economic union , constitutes interesting, if informal, social experimentation. And, federal±provinc ial±mu-nicipal relations provid e insight s into the feasibility of decentralisation in housin g policy delivery. This paper has two objectives. One is to view the Canadian experience as a set of market outcom es, and to show that this perspective is useful in examining the relevant supply , demand and policy factors. M uch of the housin g that Canadians occupy is provided throug h a com plex of markets that includes housin g ® nance, residential land, buildin g materials, construction labour, residential utilities and maintenance services. Com petition drives these markets towards equilibria in market rents across both geographical space and quality levels (see Sweeney, 1974 ; Kanemoto, 1990 ; and W eber and W iesmeth, 1990) , equilibria among the prices of alternative tenures, and equilibria in price and return among ® nancial and land assets. Public policy initiatives are often introdu ced to alter the outcome in a particular market (e.g. to increase the incidence of home ow nership); however, these initiatives also affect other sectors throug h the equilibria among markets (e.g. the loss of rent to landlords that occurs because consumers switch from renting to owning).
The second is to review policy initiatives in order to show both their breadth and, at the same time, the simplistic view that these programmes have taken of the complex of housing markets. In the context of global com petition, some policy-makers have becom e more aware of the bene® ts (or necessity) of ef® cient markets generally, and of the hidden costs of regulation and subsidies. How ever, only some of the Canadian initiatives can be though t to have enhanced market ef® ciency. W hy were the other initiatives undertaken? W ere they ill-advised? The paper reviews basic data on rental housin g market outcomes in Canada since the Second W orld W ar. It discusses important shifts in the demand for, and supply of, rental accommodation and evaluates major policy initiatives that have affected these.
Rental M arket Outcomes
Any change in outcom e in a private market for rental housing can be though t to result from shifts in demand or supply , includin g shifts that may result from a policy initiative. To begin, let us brie¯y characterise post-war changes in rental housing outcomes. Let us leave aside for the mom ent consideration of public policy initiativesÐ these are discussed later in this paperÐ and now examine signi® cant outcomes in the for-pro® t markets for rental stock and rental accommodation , and in the related market for residential ® nance. This section of the paper emphasises tw o markets: a market for rental housin g stock (whose outcomes include property prices, new construction, renovatio n, demolitions, conversions and other alterations) and a market for rental accom modation (whose outcomes include rents, vacancy rates, usage and the assignment of households to dwellings): an approach also used in Fallis (1993) , Smith et al. (1988) , Olsen (1987) , and Quigley (1979) .
Census counts of private households measure one im portant outcom e in the market for rental accommodation .
1 Between 1941 and 1991 , the number of renter households increased quickly; see Table 1.   2 By 1991 , about three persons in ten in Canada lived in households that rented their accom modation in the private, forpro® t, sector. It is dif® cult to be precise since the best available dataÐ quinque nnial census countsÐ include persons living in the conventional and non-conventional rental stock, 3 but do not identify whether rental units are for-pro® t. Further, census counts of renters do not include tenants in collective building s (large rooming houses, residency hotels and other institutional accommodation), individu al rooms in owner-occupied dwellings that are rented out to lodgers, or owned homes on rented land (in Canada, these are mainly mobile homes). W hatever their shortcom ings, census counts do show a declining incidence of renting. In the 1991 Census, 37 per cent of households were renters, down from 43 per cent in 1941. 4 Only during the Great Apartment Boom (which began in the early 1960s, peaked between 1968 and 1973 , and ended abruptly thereafter) did the incidence of renting actually rise.
Another outcome in the market for rental accommodation is rent paid (see Table  2 ). From 1951 to 1991 , gross rents paid by residential tenants increased fortyfold. The increase was substantial when viewed as a share of Personal Consumer Expend iture (PCE). B eing mindful that housing expenditure is less volatile than other consumer expenditures and hence falls as a percentage of PCE in an economic expansion (and rises during a recession), there was overall an upward trend over time; gross rents were 5.3 per cent of PCE in 1991 , up from just 3.5 per cent in 1951 . This overall increase, while substantial, can also be misleading.
T able 1. D welling s by categor y and tenure (excludi ng househo lds abroad) , C anada, 1951±91 Ð During this period, the expenditures of home-owners rose even faster. Imputed rents for home-owners were 14 per cent of PCE in 1991 up from just 7 per cent in 1951 . By 1991 , the average annual imputed rent of a home-owner was 60 per cent higher than the average rent paid by a tenant, whereas the tw o had been similar just 40 years before (see Table 2 ). Ð The increase in rents¯uctuated over this period. In the early 1950s, residential rents rose quickly, a consequence of economic expansion, in¯ation generated as a result of the Korean war, and the end of wartime rent control (see Figure 1 ). During the recession of 1957±62, average rents increased slowly. W ith the economic boom of the 1960s, rents rose more quickly, and then accelerated during the oil crises of the 1970s. The recession of 1981 ±82 slowed the rate of increase. In most cities, rents increased again sharply in the booming late 1980s before softening in the most recent recession.
A third outcome in the market for rental accommodation is the vacancy rate. The vacancy rate is the proportion of rental units (in rental buildings of six units or more) available to be let at a particular date: a unit being deemed available if presently unoccupied (and available for occupancy im mediately) or occupied but with the lease ending presently
but not yet renewed. Vacancy rates (measured only for the conventional stock) have been volatile; see Figure 2 . The vacancy rate in Calgary, a city whose economic prospects are closely tied to the oil and gas industry, has¯uctuated markedly. The effect of the Great Apartment Boom that added so much new conventional rental stock nationally can also be seen in Figure 2 . A fourth outcome of the market for rental accommodation is the gross yield on rental building s. Gross yield is estimated by dividing the sum of gross rents paid annually in Canada by the estimated asset value of the rental stock in that year: see Figure 3 .
5 Gross yield declined overall from almost 14 per cent in 1961 to under 10 per cent by 1974 (at the end of the Great Apartment Boom), and increased slowly thereafter to reach 12 per cent by 1991 . Such yields, which since the early 1970 s have rarely exceeded the current mortgage rate, raise questions about the attractiveness of investment in rental housing. Turning now to the market for rental housing stock, an im portant outcome is the volume of net additions to the stock. The ease of switching dwelling occupancy between tenures makes it dif® cult to measure the annual net production of new rental stock. An apartment buildin g might be planned as a rental project but, during construction, the developer chooses instead to market it as owner-occupied condominiums. In other cases, a developer might choose to syndicate a rental buildin g as a condominium; making it appear to be intended for owner-occupancy. Nonetheless, there are two important indicators of changing outcomes in the market for rental housin g stock.
Ð The Great Apartment Boom was unprecedented in Canada. See Figure 4 and Sm ith (1983 , p. 63) . M uch of the new stock in this period was built by the for-pro® t sector, althoug h the publi c sector also found high-rise construction an ef® cient way to create social housing . Ð Accom panyin g this new construction was much investment in alterations and improvements to the existing stock (see Table 3 ). From 1951 throug h the mid 1970s, new construction made up at least two-third s of residential gross ® xed capital formation. Ð However, since the early 1970s, new construction of convention al rental housin g stock has dw indled (see Sm ith, 1983 , p. 60) , and expenditures on alterations and im provements as a percentage of the aggregate value of the existent housin g stock have climbed.
The Dem and for Rental Housing
Canada experienced brisk population growth over the past half-century. The fertility slump of the 1920s and 1930s gave way after the Second World War to an unprecedented baby boom, which in turn gave way to the baby bust beginning in the 1960s . However, substantial immigration combined with a burgeonin g population in the childbearing age groups and greater life expectancy to increase the populatio n of Canada from 18 million in 1961 to over 27 million in 1991 (see Table 4 ). The baby boom caused the population aged 15±29 to peak near 1976 Ð the progression of the baby boom cohort into the family formation ages is mirrored in rising census counts of families (see Table 4 ). 6 At the same time, the baby bust and an accompanying decline in marriage rates helped ameliorate this increase, and led to more non-family persons.
Changes in the incomes of individu als and families are im portant in understanding the demand for rental housing . During each post-war economic boom, the average nominal incomes of individu als rose substantially. Throug h the ® rst half of the 1970s, the average incomes of Canadian men, wom en and families generally increased faster than consumer prices; hence, real incom es rose. From 1977 to 1984 , how- Coinciding with these changes in income have been changes to social programmes. Over the past half-century, C anadian governments have introduced universal health care and have subsidised higher education. They have also introduced or altered social programmes that enhance the incom es of needy households (see Table 5 ). At the same time, the less needy were adversely affected by shrinking bene® ts, and increased taxes cut into the disposable incom e of the more af¯uent. Another im portant social policy initiative, the de-institutiona lisation of the psychiatrically and physically disabled, put more low-income individu als into the private rental market.
How That household formation slowed in the ® rst half of the 1980 s is related to declining affordability. Table 6 presents estimates of the number of`potential' households that could form if every husband-wife couple, and all other persons aged 20 or older, were each to occupy a separate dwelling. The affordability index presented in Table 6 for Canada measures the cost of housing relative to the average income of a potential household; it shows that housin g became more affordable over time, except between 1981 and 1986 . As housin g became less (more) affordable, household formation slowed (gained). How did the consumers cope who might otherwise have formed separate dwellings? Coping strategies might include delay in home-leaving among youn g single adults, delay of marriage, and sharing a dwelling with a partner instead of living alone. How ever, althoug h household formation slowed during the early 1980s, the amount of doublin g up was not suf® cient to cause average household size to rise. Arguably, the demand for rental housin g by a household, once formed, can be viewed in terms of household preferences (usually proxied by household size, presence of children and family composition), the price of renting, the selling price of ow ner-occupied housing, access to home-ownership, and consumer income. Rudel (1987) argues that family sizeÐ long though t to be an important determinant of the shift from renting to ow ningÐ became less im portant in the 1970 s relative to economic considerations. Figure 1 reveals the rapid increase in the price of renting that occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s. As real incomes began to drop in the late 1970s, the renter households that did form tended to consume less housing Ð a smaller, lower-quality, less accessible, or otherwise less adequate dw ellingÐ or possibly a different tenure (e.g. home-ownership, cooperative housing ) than would have been the case had housin g not become less affordable. At the same time, the ranks of renters were swelled by non-traditional households (which typically have modest incomes). Again, this should have increased the demand for smaller or lower-quality rental dwellings. Evidence of this decrease in housing consumption (relative to home-owners) has already been noted in Table 2 .
Finally, the attractiveness of home-ownership is tied to the potential for capital gains. In most parts of Canada, there were three recent house price bubbles : 1974 ±75, 1980 ± 81 and 1987 ±89 . W ith each bubble, some households that might otherwise rent were drawn into home-ownership. In terms of access to home-ownership, the introduction of condo minia to C anada was also im portant. Before the mid 1960s, the con- Table 2 ) to the asse t valu e of the housin g stock (see source to Table 3 ). This is a maxim um gross yield becaus e the valu e of the housin g stoc k does not includ e the value of the land on w hich it is situated .
sumer who wanted to live in a high-rise or estate town-hous e generally had to rent. Equity cooperatives were one possibility for the consumer interested in home-ownership, but these were not widely used. The condominium form enhanced access to home-ownership, and many of the early condominium projects were marketed speci® cally as a lowcost alternative to renting .
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W ho currently lives in rented dwellings in Canada? From the 1986 Census public use sample, we can construct estimates of the likelihood of living in a rented dwelling by gender and marital status for single years of age (see Figure 5 ). Ð M arried: Among both men and wom en, the incidence of renting declines sharply with age, botto ming out at about 20 per cent at around age 40, and then increasing above age 60. Ð Single: Under the age of 15, singles live principally in a parent' s home and thus have a corresponding incidence of renting . Over 15, home-leaving becomes more prevalent, and the transition is typically to rented accommodation. There is some home-ownership at older ages, but through out the prime home-buying years (early adulthoo d through age 50), the majority of singles are renters. Ð Divorced: Divorced men and wom en have about the same high incidence of renting as do singles of the same age. Ð Widowed: W idowed men and wom en are more likely to be renters than are married persons of the same age. However, they are less likely to rent than are their divorced or single peers.
Supply of Rental Housing Stock
Let us simplify the market for new rental stock by im agining initially on the one hand a group of developers who construct and supply new conventional rental housin g, and on the other hand a group of investors who purchase such buildin gs to pro® t from renting dwellings to tenants. In such a market, the price of an apartment buildin g as an asset is determined by the expected¯ow of net rental revenue. The pro® tability of supplying new buildings into this market is determined by rents, costs of construction (labour, building materials, ® nancing and land costs), production technology and planning and buildin g regulation. Land costs are one important com ponent of construction costs. The available price series for residential land in selected metropolitan areas across Canada is shown in Figure 6 . W hile these series extend back only to 1976, they do show the bubbles in land prices that occurred in many cities at the same time as the price bubbles for ow neroccupied housing .
The prices paid for buildin g materials also changed over time. New materials were brought to market: e.g. plastics, new forms of sheathing and particle board. Inexpensive buildin g component systems became commonplace, reducing the need for skilled construction labour. Also helpful in moderating costs were innovations in factory-assembled parts: e.g. roof trusses, pre-hung doors, prefabricated windows, kitchen cabinets. Overall, the prices of buildin g materials fell slightly relative to consumer prices during the 1970 s and 1980 s (see Figure 7) .
The relative cost of construction labour also changed over this period. Before 1976 , unit labour costs had been increasing quickly relative to consumer prices generally. However, after 1976, unit labour costs increased only modestly, typically by less than the increase in CPI. Again, see Figure 7 .
Changes in the cost of ® nancing have also been im portant in determining the supply of rental housin g stock (see Figure 8 ). Nom inal interest rates in Canada increased steadily throug h the 1960 s and 1970s, peaking at almost 20 per cent in the early 1980s. Since then, interest rates have remained high (relative to the 1960s) in both nominal and real terms.
Finally, there have been im portant changes in construction technolog y in recent decades. M cKellar (1993 , p. 149) mentions standardisation in design, prefabrication of components, the¯ying-fo rm construction techniqu e (a concrete forming system that streamlines on-site pours) and the European climbing crane. These changes made it Sources : Invest m ent data from N ationa l Incom e and Expenditu re Accounts : Annua l Estim ates. Nationa l balanc e sheet data from Nationa l Balance Shee t: breakdo w n of resident ial structur es into ow ned and rented capita l on the basis of im pute d and gross rents paid in Table 2 . Note: Ð indicate s data not availabl e.
possible to construct high-rise building s at lower unit costs and enabled the landlord downstream to pro® t from the economies of operation afforded by large structures. Standardisation also im proved the liquidity of the rental housin g stock. An investor who purchases an apartment building with a unique design, materials or construction techniqu e must be wary of the need for costly repairs downstream. The problems and costs of operating and maintaining standardised buildings are better known, and hence more predictable.
This discussion has focused on the supply of new stock. However, also im portant is the supply of rental housing stock that arises from the conversion of existing structuresÐ e.g. a detached dw elling converted into a duplex structure. Developers who convert structures to rental housin g face many costs that are similar to new construction: for materials, labour and ® nancing. W hat makes conversion activity different is partly that it is though t to be more labour-in tensive than new construction and partly that pro® tability is sensitive to the resale price of structures to be converted.
Supply of Rental Accomm odation
Involve d in the market for rented accommodation are ® rms in the business of property ownership, property management and building repair and maintenance, as well as manufacturers and suppliers of maintenance equipment and supplies. W e have relatively little information about these ® rms. Instead, in this section, we develop a theoretical framework for viewing rental investment, then review post-war changes that have affected the supply of accommodation .
The Landlord ' s Problem
Suppos e an individ ual investor is thinkin g of purchasing an apartment buildin g for the purpose of renting out individu al¯ats. Let us assume that the attractiveness of such an investment is related solely to the present value of the after-tax pro® t to be gained from the stream of gross rents generated and the resale value of the buildin g downstream. The investor as landlord intends to enter into a (lease) contract with each prospective tenant which speci® es a rent to be paid to the landlord, the rights and responsibilities of the tenant, the obligations of the landlord to maintain and operate the buildin g, and legal remedies. Suppos e that we simplify the problem confrontin g our investor initially by assuming zero transactions costs, perfect information and no risks either in renting speci® cally or in investing generally. In a riskless world, the investor would foresee the present value of the after-tax pro® ts associated with this enterprise. If our investor is identical to other demanders and suppliers in the market for housing stock, the market price for an apartment buildin g would rise or fall until the present value of the after-tax pro® ts provide s the same rate of return is identical to that for other ® nancial assets.
In reality, the investor' s problem is more com plicated than this, even if we continu e to absent risk and imperfect information. Indicative here are decisions made by the investor about renovation: see Arnault (1975) . Normally, a buildin g (here taken to include plant, ® ttings and equipment) deteriorates over time. Som e of this deterioration is offset by ongoing maintenance, and lease provisions may require that the landlord keep the dwellings in a speci® ed state of repair. However, the landlord usually has some discretionÐ e.g. repainting can be delayed, a broken pump can be replaced with a new pump with a lower capacity, small landlord s can choose to do repair work themselvesÐ and can choose from among diverse streams of future renovation expenditures. W ith each stream of expenditures is associated a sequence of lease arrangements (including rent), a downstream resale value for the building , and hence potentially a distinct present value of after-tax pro® ts.
A related complication for the investor is selection of tenants. Some tenants are more costly to serve. W hile the landlord may be able to evict such tenants eventually, a costly tenant can reduce the pro® tability of the investment. However, this does not im ply that costly tenants will not be served in a competitive market. Rather, market rents will be higher for costly tenants, and investors may well target particular kinds of tenants to attract to their buildings. See Guasch and M arshall (1987 ) and M iron (1990) .
The economic roles of the landlord are broadly twofold: ® nancier and property manager. As ® nancier, the investor chooses when to purchase the buildin g and how much to pay for it, how to ® nance the purchase, how well to maintain the building , what parts of the rental housin g market to target, and when to dispose of the buildin g (sell it or convert it to another use). As property manager, the landlord seeks to operate the buildin g ef® ciently on a day-to-day basis. This involves ® nding both the least-costly way of providing a given level of service and the least-costly tenants from within the market segment to which the buildin g is targeted.
W here the landlord is a small owner (for example, rents an upstairs¯at in his or her own home), the owner may well combine both roles. In a larger apartment buildin g, the owner may well devolv e property management to an on-site agent. Investment in rental housin g is not without a risk that arises essentially because the investor typically borrows long-term (throug h a mortgage) to lend short-term (throug h tenancy leases that typically are only 1±3 years in length). The investor generally borrows by taking out a mortgage amortised over 20±35 years. Presumably, a knowledgeable landlord can accurately predict the pro® tability of rents obtained on the initial lease. However, because the rental market may change unexpectedly in the future, the landlord runs the risk that rents downstream are less than was expected at the time the buildin g was ® nanced. In one sense, the problem is the same for any rental enterprise: for instance, a car rental ® rm. W hat makes car rentals different from apartment rentals, however, is the stock market in which rental equipment is resold. In the case of car rentals, that would be the second-hand car market. W here car rental ® rms are a small component of the used car market, a car rental enterprise will ® nd that resale price is insensitive to outcomes in the car rental market. Put differently, the car rental agency can dispose of unneeded cars in the largely-unrelated market for second-hand, ow ner-driven vehicles.
The closest equivalent to a car rental enterprise would be a landlord who owns and rents out a single dw elling (freehold or condominium); the landlord there has the optio n of selling the dw elling within the market for owner-occupied dwellings, and the cost of physically converting the dwelling to enable owner-occupancy are zero or negligible. In contrast, the landlord who owns a larger apartment buildin g may well ® nd that conversion to another use (for example, an of® ce building ) is unpro® table and that selling individu al dwellings to home-owners would require conversion to a condominium, cooperative, or co-ownership project. Otherwise, demanders in the market for stock would consist only of those who intend to continu e that rental housin g enterprise, and the resale price of the building will rise or fall with changes in downstream rents.
W hat complicates this argument is the variety of property ownership. Freehold ownership, in which the owner has title to land and building , has been the traditional form of home-ownership in Canada. Started in Canada in the 1960s, condo minium ownership gives an owner title to a dw elling within a project and an obligation to pay a ® xed share of the costs of maintaining the common elements (typically, land and superstructure) of the project. W here the landlord holds title to the individual rental dwelling in freehold or condominium ow nership, reselling that property within the market for owner-occupied housin g is relatively easy. As a though t experiment, let us ignore the effects of income taxation, in¯ation and discount rate variation, and im agine that the investor ® nances the purchase of the apartment buildin g with a 30-year level-payment mortgage, and then negotiates 30-year netnet leases with tenants. Under these net-net leases, tenants pay a ® xed monthly rent (to cover mortgage interest expense plus the opportunity cost of the investor' s equity ) for the next 30 years, plus a varying monthly amount representing the tenant' s share of expenses for heat, light, utilities, property taxes, insurance, ground skeeping, buildin g maintenance and depreciation, superintendency, and all other costs incurred by the landlord. In other words, the lease would foresee every continge ncy and the tenant would bear all risks in regard to changes in the cost of maintaining the buildin g during the 30-year period. In this situation, the investor' s behaviour is determined entirely by speculation about the (net-net) monthly rent upon renewal 30 years downstream, or equivalently the resale price of the building .
If these are anticipated to rise, the investor would earn above-normal pro® ts: if the rent or resale price declines, the investor would not earn even normal pro® ts. In this case, the investor' s role is simply that of an arbitrageur between tw o markets: buyin g rental housin g stock when the current stock price is relatively low, and selling stock when the current stock price is too high in light of rents in the market for accom modation .
In Canada, such long-term residential tenancy agreements are uncommon. The closest equivalent is the`time share' tenancy sometimes used to sell recreation property. Instead, landlord s typically assume superintendency, maintenance and depreciation expenses, and property taxes; sometimes, they also include heat, light and/or utilities with the dw elling. In so doing, landlords gamble that market rents will increase downstream as quickly as these expenses. Long-term agreements may be uncommon because it is dif® cult to envisage a lease that would adequately cover continge ncies.
Uncertainty about prospective tenants adds another complication. There are two ele- ments here. One is the uncertainty that arises because rental dwellings are not all identical. Because of heterogeneity in the stock, the landlord knows that tenants and other landlords are unlikely to have perfect knowledge of market rents. If they did, the rent everywhere for an equivalent dw elling would be the same, and landlords would each ® nd that the demand for their dwellings is perfectly elastic at this rent. In the absence of perfect information, the higher the asking rent, the longer the landlord will have to wait before ® nding a willing tenant: see Stull (1978 ) and M iron (1990) . The second element is the uncertainty that arises because tenants are not all identical. The landlord faces the prospect of adverse selection (wherein prospective costly tenants misrepresent themselves as low-cost tenants) and moral hazard (wherein tenants fail to care for the dw elling as might a home-owner). See M iceli (1989).
Post-war Changes in the Supply of Rental Accom modatio n
Fallis (1993 , p. 79) argues that the technology for producing rental accommodation in Canada has not changed substantially since 1945 . How ever, the business of renting accommodation may well have changed in some im portant ways. One example is the retro® t of existing building s with computerised systems to control more ef® ciently heating and air conditioning equipment. Another im portant change is the development of new cost-saving equipment (e.g. energy-ef® cient lighting systems) and materials (e.g. wear-resistant carpets). Other innova tions reduced the labour needed for maintenance (e.g. lowmaintenance wall coverings and surveillance cameras). Still another innova tion has been the upgrading of management information systems. Important too have been post-war changes in sources and methods of ® nancing: see Poapst (1993) . Revisions to the federal Bank Act in the late 1960 s authorised chartered banks to enter the mortgage lending business and removed the 6 per cent interest rate ceiling. Canada' s principal banks are large ® nancial institutions; each with many hundreds of branches across the country. They intermediate in the mortgage market; retailing mortgages to landlords, developers and Real rate is nominal rate less year-ov er-yeari ncreas e in CPI.
home-owners on the one hand, and then pooling or repackaging them for investors on the other hand. As a result, the market for housing ® nance is more liquid and competitive. Consumers, developers and landlords bene® t from more¯exibility and variety in mortgage terms and better service. The extension of NHA mortgage insurance to rental building s and legislation authorising private mortgage insurance were also im portant. So too was the introduction by Canada M ortgage and Housing Corporation and lending institutions of mortgage-backed securities (collatoralised mortgage obligations) to increase the supply of mortgage funds.
Also im portant have been other innovations in ® nancing by which investors spread the risks involve d in rental housing . The three traditional methods of investmentÐ sole ownership, partnership and private corporationÐ were complemented by innovations such as limited partnerships and condo minium syndication. As well, where investment becomes of suf® ciently large scale, perhaps drawn by the attractiveness of spreading risk across cities, incorporation as a public company can be an attractive possibility. In the 1960 s and 1970s, some major corporate integrated developer-landlords did emerge in Canada, only to run into ® nancial dif® culty downstream. The condo minium sector has become im portant in the ® nancing and supply of new rental units. As of 1991 , up to one-half of all condominium apartments in Canada were occupied by renters. Althoug h originally introduced to allow owner-occupancy in multi-unit buildin gs, condominiums can provid e small landlord s with a liquid investment, well-de® ned monthly costs and the ability to realise capital gains by reselling the dw elling to an owner-occupier (or another landlord) at some future date. This has been occurring both conventionally (for example, when condominium ownership is used to syndicate a rental buildin g) and non-conventionally (when the condominium buildin g is home to renters and owners).
Post-war Changes in Taxation
Over the past half-century, changes in in-com e taxation have affected the pro® tability of investment in rental housin g construction.
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M any of these changes have been driven, not by housin g policy, but to prevent abuse by taxpayers claim ing business losses on`rental properties' acquired by the taxpayer for other purpos es.
Sm all investors are the group most affected by changes in incom e tax provisions: see M iron (1988 , pp. 255±257) and Clayton Research Associates Limited (1991, pp. 44±49). New building s typically generate rents that are low relative to construction costs for the ® rst few years; however, with in¯ation, rents increase over the years making the investment more attractive. This feature of rental housing makes it attractive to small investors such as doctors, lawyers, accountants and other professionals who are currently in a high marginal tax bracket and hence are willing to incur losses now in return for a good return downstream (for example, upon retirement). A key factor for such investors is allowable depreciation. In 1954, new Capital Cost Allowance (CCA) provisions de® ned allowable depreciation expense for the purposes of incom e taxation. CCA for woodframe building s, for example, was initially set at a liberal 10 per cent annually (compared with 5 per cent for concrete and steel reinforced buildin gs), reduced to 5 per cent in 1978 , and 4 per cent in 1987 ; the CC A became 4 per cent for all rental buildin gs in 1987. CC A provide s an incidental subsidy to landlords to the extent it exceeds economic depreciation. How ever, when a buildin g is eventually resold, the excess of market value over depreciated value (up to original cost) is recaptured into income for that year for tax purpos es; any excess over origin al cost would be capital gains. In effect, liberal CC A rates allow landlords to defer some income tax until disposition.
In another major revision to the federal Income Tax Act in 1971 , investment in rental housing was made less attractive for small investors. Losses created by capital cost allowances for rental property were no longer deductible from non-rental incom e, except for life insurance companies and corporations in the business of real estate. Also, the poolin g of recapture on the sale of one building with C CA losses on other buildin gs was ended. As well, 50 per cent of capital gains became taxable on most assets; a notable exception being a taxpayer' s principal residence. 10 That the Great Apartment Boom ended shortly thereafter suggests that the effect of these changes on investment in rental housin g was substantial.
The federal government introdu ced the M ultiple Unit Residential Buildin g (M URB) programme in 1974 to make rental housin g more attractive to small investors. Amendments to the Incom e Tax Act enabled those investing in MURBs to deduct from personal income rental losses incurred throug h capital cost allowances and soft costs. The M UR B programme led to a splurge of new housin g investment; approxim ately 195 000 units were approved under the M URB programme: the programme ended in 1979 , but was reactivated from 1980 to 1982 .
Other changes in the Income Tax Act have also affected the attractiveness of investing in rental housing . In 1974 , the federal government revised the Income Tax Act to remove the tax deductibility of carrying charges on land awaiting redevelopment. Tax rules capping losses for limited partnerships that are commonly used in rental project syndication were introdu ced in 1986 .
Another change that deterred would-b e developers occurred in 1981 when the Incom e Tax Act was revised to treat soft costs as capital costs in rental buildin gs. Soft costs are expenditures by an investor that are indirectly related to the cost of acquisition: they include: mortgage application, insurance and guarantee fees; legal, accounting and appraisal fees related to acquisition; promotion , marketing and advertising costs; landscaping costs; other pre-opening and start-up costs; interest costs and property taxes during construction; architects' fees; cost of buildin g permits. Prior to 1981 , all soft costs could be deducted as expenses in the year paid. As of 1981 , only selected soft costs could be expensed. For anyone other than life insurance ® rms and corporations in the real estate business, the remaining soft costs must now be capitalised into the value of the buildin g and expensed as CCA downstream.
A Half-century of Rental Housing Policy
Over the past 50 years, governments at all levels in Canada have introdu ced policies that directly affect the operation of the rental housing market: see also M iron, 1988 M iron, , pp. 238±267, Sm ith, 1981 Rose, 1980 ; and Firestone, 1951 . M any of the early large-scale initiatives in housin g policy originated at the federal level, and the federal government continue s to be a major player. The amount of direct subsidy paid annually by the federal government under the NHA (which includes both rental and home-ownership housin g) has climbed markedly over the past few decades (see Figure 9 ). By 1991 , the federal government alone was spending $1.9b n annually on housin g subsidies. These subsidies do not include capital grants paid under the NHA (shown separately in Figure 9 ), tax expenditures, loan guarantees and subsidies given by the provin ces and territories either as part of NHA joint programmes or for a provinc e' s own housing programme. Federal governments have had three principal objectives in spending this money. One has been to ensure that C anadians have access to decent housin g at a price they can afford. The second objective has been to use the residential construction sector to spur a lacklustre economy, or to slow in¯ationary growth. The third objective has been to improve access to home ow nership among Canadians of modest income.
The tools available to governments include direct expenditure, tax expenditure, regulation, research and developm ent, and loan guarantees. To get a sense of the range of policies that have been tried, let us brie¯y review federal initiatives over the past halfcentury, focusing on direct expenditure and regulation.
Direct Expenditure: Urban Renewal and Social Housing
Under the Urban Renewal Program (URP), initiated in 1944, the federal government provided grants to cover 50 per cent of the costs incurred by municipalities in slum clearance. How ever, in 1968 , the federal government im posed a moratorium on new URP approvals and on the developm ent of large public housing projects. W hatever its merits, slum clearance had fallen into disrepute: eviction and expropriation were often necessary, and there were no assurances that dislocated individu als would be rehoused within their neighb ourhoo d either during reconstruction or afterwards. Important too was that slum clearance disrupted local housin g markets by creating a public housin g agency that com peted with private suppliers and adding to the risks confronting landlords.
URP was eventually replaced by four new less-obtrusive programmes. The Neighbou rhood Improvement Program (NIP) provide d grants to upgrade publi c infrastructure in designated low-income residential areas (see Figure 10 ). During the 5-year life of the programme, 479 neighb ourhood s across Canada participated in it with costs (about $500m) shared by all levels of government. The Residential R ehabilitation Assistance Program (RRAP) gave subsidised loans to home-owners and landlord s to upgrade substandard dw ellings. Of the approximately 314 000 units rehabilitated under RRAP betw een 1973 and 1984 , 29 per cent were renter-occupied. The Rural and Native Housing (RNH) programme gave loans to individuals to ® nance home construction and renovation, as well as provid e operating subsidies. The latter cover the difference betw een amortisation costs plus property taxes (plus heating costs as of 1986) , and 25 per cent of income and are shared on a 75±25 per cent basis between the federal and participating provinc ial governments. Finally, the Com munity Services C ontribution Program (CSCP) subsidised municipal capital projects: $400 m was distribu ted, with payments extended until 1984 .
The ® rst post-war initiative in public housing was the Federal/Provincial Public Housing Program introdu ced in 1949 . This shared capital costs and operating losses of approved projects on a 75±25 per cent basis between the federal and respective provinc ial governments. How ever, in spite of the generous federal subsidy, the provin ces had undertaken to construct only 12 000 dwellings by 1964.
Amendments to the NHA, introdu ced in 1964 , included a public housin g construction programme and a non-pro® t housing programme for the elderly that gave evengreater subsidies, and did become widely used. These amendments entitled provinc es, municipalities and other public agencies to receive 90 per cent loans for the construction of low-incom e housing projects where tenants pay rents scaled to their incom e. The federal government covers half of the operating losses of these projects. These provisions were used to create more than 200 000 public housin g units. These provisions were effectively ended in 1978 .
Social housin g programmes of the day were criticised because they led to the concentration of target group s in large, homogeneous, often high-rise, residential com plexes with attendant social problems. One solutio n is to move target households into the private rental stock using shelter allowances or rent supplements. The federal government introduced a Rent Supplement Program in 1969 . In 1977 , British Columbia became the ® rst provinc e to introdu ce shelter allowances (for elderly renters only). Another solutio n is to integrate social housin g into socially-mixed neighbourhoo ds. The provision of social housin g in Canada took a ® rst step in this direction in 1973 in the form of non-pro® t and cooperative housin g programmes under NHA 15.1 and 34.18 (see Figure 10 ). Eligible organisations were entitled to receive 90 per cent loans with an interest rate subsidy of 8 per cent and a 10 per cent capital contribution . These deep-subsidy programmes were among the ® rst wherein a federal low-income housin g programme did not require matching ® nancial com mitments on the part of other governments. New Nonpro® t and Cooperative Housing Programs were introdu ced in 1978 under NHA 56.1. Under these programmes, cooperative and non-pro® t housin g agencies were entitled to receive maximum assistance equivalent to the difference between mortgage payments at market interest rates and at 2 per cent. Betw een 1974 and 1984, alm ost 124 000 units were constructed with these substantial subsidies. Fundin g was also available to assist in the initial developm ent stages of these proje cts.
In 1986 , facing a severe budget de® cit, the federal government ended these Non-pro ® t and Housing Cooperative Programs. A new version of these programmes was introduced which targeted subsidies. Cooperatives could still construct projects for a socially-mixed cliente Á le, but an NHA subsidy was given only for low-rent units. By 1992 , however, even this version was ended.
The federal subsidies for urban renewal and public housin g are based on a common perspective; namely, that inadequate housin g is a problem, rather than a symptom. They did not, for example, see blight and sub-standard housin g simply as a symptom of poverty. Further, these programmes largely ignored how the housin g market responds; how developers alter decisions about new construction and conversions; how landlord s change their asset holding s and renovation decisions; how consumers respond in terms of living arrangement, tenure and housin g consumption .
Direct Expenditure: Supply of Private Rental Housing
The federal government also sought to encourage the private sector to supply more low-rent housing . An early instance was the Lim ited Dividend (LD) programme, introduced in 1944 . Loans were made to com panies and individ uals for the construction of new housing or to purchase existing housing . These loans limited investment return to 5 per cent and controlled rents. During 1946 ± 64, 330 loans were approved, providing 28 037 dwellings. In the mid 1960s, loan condition s were enhanced: loans were made up to 95 per cent of value; the investment return limit was increased; mandatory controls on rent were restricted to the ® rst 15-year period) and project eligibility was broadened to include hostels and dormitories as well as self-contained units. The LD programme has been inactive since the mid 1970s.
The LD programme illustrates the use of a policy approach in which developers are assured a fair rate of return on their investment. Another early instance of this approach was the federal Rental Insurance Plan, introduced in 1948 , that provide d long-term, low-interest loans to builders of low-rent housing and guaranteed landlords a 2 per cent net return on their investment. About 19 000 units were constructed under this programme which ended in 1950 .
In 1975 , the federal government introduced the Assisted Rental Program (ARP) to assist in the production of new affordable rental housin g in the private sector. Interestfree loans of up to 10 per cent of the original loan amount in subsequent years over a 10-year period (in some cases extended to 15 years) were granted for the purpos e of keeping rents affordable (see Figure 10) . New com mitments were ended in 1978; over 122 000 rental units were produ ced under ARP between 1975 and 1980 . How ever, in 1991 , expenditures under ARP surged as defaults mounted on problem loans.
ARP was followed in 1981 by the Canada Rental Supply Plan (C RSP) under which sponsors of eligible projects could obtain 15-year interest-free loans of up to $7500 per rental unit constructed. Loans were to be repaid over 25 years. Over 24,00 0 rental units were built under CR SP across Canada before termination in 1984 (see Figure 10) .
The Municipal Incentives Grant (M IG) programme, introdu ced in 1975, took a different approach to the subsidisation of lowincome housing. This federal programme encouraged the developm ent of land for housin g of moderate size, price and density by offering municipalities $100 0 for each qualifying unit built. The programme terminated in 1978 , with paym ents extended to 1982.
These housin g programmes were designed to elicit response in markets for rental housing. The LD and Rental Insurance Plans were designed to reduce risks for investors. ARP and CRSP were intended to reduce effective interest costs and thus spur construction at a time of high interest rates, and M IG was a carrot to make affordable housin g more attractive to municipal governments. At the same time, each of these programmes represented a dabbling by governments small in scale and sporadic over timeÐ that never answered the question of why and how much government should be subsidising rental accommodation.
Regulation : Rent Control and Security of Tenure
In 1940 , rent control was introdu ced by the federal W artime Prices and Trade Board. Soon after the war, rent control was dismantled and, for the next 25 years, residential rents in the private sector elsewhere went largely unregulated. In 1974 , a rentalsman was introdu ced (abolished in 1985) in British Columbia to mediate landlord±tenant disputes and review large rent increases. Then, in 1975, with the introduction of federal wage and price controls, rent regulation was established in each provinc e and territory. W age and price control s were a temporary measure to control in¯ation, and were abandoned soon thereafter. However, rent regulation to date has been abandon ed only in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and New Brunsw ick.
In Ontario, tinkering with rent control has continue d to the presentday: see Arnott and M intz, 1987 ; Fallis and Smith, 1985; Fallis, 1985; M iron and Culling worth, 1983 ; and Sm ith and Tom linson, 1981 . Rent regulation was initiated under the Residential Premises Rent Review Act (RPRRA) of 1975 . Rent regulation took the form of a review of rent increases for dwellings covered by the legislation. Three provisions were made for rent increases: guideline increase, cost passthrough , and ® nancial loss. Initially, the legislation applied only to rental dw ellings in existence prior to 1976 . In 1979 , RPR RA was replaced by the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA), with a lower guideline rate of increase. In 1982 , Ontario passed the Residential Com plexes Financing Costs Restraint Act of 1982, which limited the rent increases obtainable throug h ® nancial loss. In 1986 , RTA was repealed and replaced by the Rent Regulation Act (RRA). Guideline rates of increase were then set annually by a formula related to changes in costs of maintaining rental building s. Guideline rates for the ® rst time applied to the`maximum rent' ; actual rent may be lower, althoug h the initial maximum rent was the existing rent for rental dw ellings in use at enactment, or ® rst rent paid since for newer (or other) dwellings. A rent directory was introduced under RRA to record rents for individual apartments, and rent regulation was extended to rental dwellings built since 1976.
The government of Ontario struck a Com mission of Inquiry into Residential Tenancies (the Thom Commission). The second volume of that Report, published in 1987, argues that Ontario' s scheme of rent regulation should be revoked, that landlord s should be able to charge fair market rents, and that tenants who are unable to afford such rents be subsidised. How ever, that advice was ignored . The RRA was amended in 1991 and replaced by the Rent C ontrol Act (RCA) in 1992. RCA exempts new rental housin g from rent control for a period of 5 years. RCA also carefully limits the kind of capital expenditure for which landlord s can seek rent increases, permits tenants to apply for a rent reduction even in the absence of a rent increase by the landlord, and increases the policing of landlords to ensure compliance.
Since 1945 , there have also been substantial changes to landlord±tenant legislation. In 1969 , the Ontario Landlord and Tenant Act (LTA) was proclaim ed, taking precedence over any lease agreement. In most residential tenancies, the landlord can evict only with a court order. Ground s for eviction are restricted. Upon termination, residential tenancies automatically renew on a monthly basis under LTA unless a new lease is signed. Tenants can sub-let. Landlords may neither seize contents, nor change locks to the premises. In general, landlords cannot enter a tenant' s living quarters withou t permission or advance notice. Landlords must maintain property in good repair. Landlord s are limited to a month' s rent as a security deposit; and must pay interest on the latter. W here, at end of tenancy, landlord and tenant disagree about the amount of the damage deposit to be retained by the landlord, court approval must be obtained.
In 1974 , to deal with the loss of rental units resulting from condominium conversions, British Columbia became the ® rst provinc e to give municipalities the ability to stop the conversion of rental units. In 1980 , the City of Toronto rezoned every site in the City that contained apartment building s 20 years of age or older to make redevelopment unpro ® table. In 1986 , the provinc e of Ontario passed the Rental Housing Protection Act (RHPA) to restrict landlords from converting rental accommodation to other uses.
W hat Can Be Learned from the Canadian Experience?
This paper has served tw o functions. One was to lay out a theoretical perspective in which the Canadian experience can be seen as market outcomes, and to show that this perspective is useful in systematically examining the supply , demand and policy factors that have shaped this outcome. The second has been brie¯y to review policy initiatives in order to show both the wide range of initiatives that have been undertaken and, at the same time, the relatively simplistic (and often short-term) view that these programmes have taken of the complex of housing markets. W hat can be learned from the Canadian experience?
Liquidity. The risk involved in borrowing long to lend short deters investment in rental housing. Improvin g the liquidity of markets for rental housing stock and related investment tools helps spread that risk and hence attract investment. M ortgage-based securities, condominium syndications, limited partnerships and head leases are all useful devices for spreading risks. Regulation that reduces liquidity, e.g. that prevent conversions of rental buildin gs, will be detrimental. Also of bene® t in improvin g liquidity is standardisation of rental building s: in materials, design and construction.
Federalism and subsidies. The Canadian experience offers insight into the issue of decentralisation of housing policy. Canada' s constitution im plies that housin g falls within the domain of provinc ial government. However, the provinces have traditionally been reluctant to engage in costly housin g programmes of their own, and have generally participated in federal-provincial programmes only when the federal subsidies were large. W hy? W ould the provinc es not allocate their own tax dollars for this purpos e in this absence of federal subsidies, even though they are responsible for housing ? W hy not? Do the provinces not believe that housing is suf® ciently im portant in the policy agenda; that subsidies are the appropriate tool to address the housing problem?
Objectives. Curiously, for all the housin g initiatives tried in Canada, the objectives of housin g policy have never been clear. Loosely, the principal objective has been to provid e decent housin g for all Canadians at an affordable price. How ever, the terms`decent' and`affordable' have never been de® ned in terms that might make housin g policy comparable with other aspects of social policy.
Income maintena nce. Governments in Canada simultaneously promote incom e maintenance on the one hand and provid e housin g subsidies on the other. Do we need both? Can we not provid e adequate and affordable housing best by raising incom es among the needy? Of course, there may well be a need for both incomes and housin g policies; my point here is simply that Canadian governments have not clari® ed how the objectives of housin g policy differ from income maintenance.
The small investor. The small investor has always been im portant in the supply of rental housing . The attractiveness of rental housin g to such investors is sensitive to the rules governing taxation of rental income. The Canadian experience suggests how im portant it is for governments to be careful in the details of such taxation (depreciation allowances, soft costs, rental losses, capital gains and recapture) in order to avoid sudden changes in the rate of investment in rental housin g stock.
Notes
1. In Canadia n Censuses , a private househo ld is the person , or set of persons , livin g in a private dw elling . The latte r is a set of structurally separate living quarter s with its ow n private entranc e. Private dwelling s exclud e acco m modatio n in collecti ve building s. 2. In all Censuse s sinc e 1941 , a househo ld is deem ed to rent its dw ellin g if no mem ber of the househo ld owns it. In the 195 1 Census only , a dw ellin g was owner-occ upied only if owned by the head of househo ld of a m ember of the im m ediate family. In all these Censuses , the dw ellin g is deem ed to be owned even if (1) there is an outstand ing m ortgag e or othe r lien on the property ; (2) it is situate d on rented or leased land; or (3) it is a condo m iniu m unit. Other dwelling s are deemed to be rented even if no rent is paid . Persons livin g in continui ng housin g cooperatives, whether equity or non-equ ity, are deemed to be renters . 3. The convent ional renta l stoc k consist s of dwelling s in apartment block s and row-housing project s that are designe d and built to be rented . The non-con ventiona l renta l stock consists of single detache d dw ellings ,¯ats carved out of form er single detache d dwellings , and apartm ents in condom iniu m building s, and other building s that were built to be owner-occ upied . Steele (1993 ) discusses the grow ing importanc e of the nonconvent iona l rental stock in Canada . 4. These counts includ e househo lds that rent publicly assisted , non-inst itutiona l housing ; thes e are com monly though t to be not m ore than 6 per cent of the tota l stock of privat e dwellings. 5. This estim ate overstat es the yield to a landlord since it ignore s the valu e of the land asse t on which the rental buildin g is standing. T his estim ate also ignore s the effect of resale value of the buildin g on econo mic return to a landlord . 6. A s de® ned in the Canadia n census , a family is a husband -wife couple plus any co-resident never-married childre n (regardl ess of age), or a lone paren t livin g with one or m ore never-marrie d children ; anyon e else is a nonfamily person . 7. For a descript ion of kinds of C anadia n homeowners who live in condo miniu ms, see M eligran a (1993) . 8. A split between these roles is evidenc ed in the use of`head ' leases . In a head lease , an entrepre neuria l propert y manager purchas es from the investo r the right to rent out dwelling s in the building . The propert y m anager pays an annual fee to the investo r and earn s inco me from the differen ce between the fee and the rents collecte d. The head lease typicall y also speci® es maintena nce to be underta ken by the propert y manager . 9. The federa l govern m ent has also introduc ed com m odity taxation , ® rst the Federa l Sales Tax (FST) and late r the Goods and Service s Tax (GST), with respec t to housin g constru ction. See Smith (1991 ) for furthe r discussion of the im plication s of the G ST for real estate m arkets. 10. In 1985, the federa l govern ment introduc ed a lifetim e cum ulative capita l gains exem ption : initiall y to be $500 000 , the exem ptio n w as cappe d at $10 0 000 in 1987. However, this incentiv e to inves t in assets (includi ng renta l housing ) w as offset w hen the capita l gains inclusio n rate was raise d to 66 2 3 per cent in 1988 , then 75 per cent in 1990 . A s well, Cumulativ e Net Invest m ent Loss (CN IL) tax rules, introduc ed in 1988, limit the net capital gain s that can be tax-shelt ered by the capita l gain s exem ption.
